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ABSTRACT 
Under what conditions, why, and for whom are framing effects most likely? In this paper, we 
build on the existing literature (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; 
Evans & Over, 1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Simon, 1956; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000), in providing answers to these questions. We 
hypothesized that individuals who engage a decision task with an analytic/systematic versus 
holistic/heuristic processing style are especially insensitive to the influence of framing effects. 
Therefore, we predicted that the way in which a decision is framed should have a relatively 
weak influence on those who were either induced (Experiment 1) or predisposed (Experiment 2) 
to adopt a predominantly analytic/systematic versus holistic/heuristic processing style. The 
results of both experiments supported this position. 
  
Over the last few decades, there has been considerable 
interest in examining how the framing of a decision task 
influences the types of decisions that people make. 
Framing effects refer to ‘‘the finding that decision 
makers respond differently to different but objectively 
equivalent descriptions of the same problem’’ (Kuhberger, 
1998, p. 150). Research has examined both the 
theoretical components of framing (e.g., Fagley & 
Miller, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) as well as its 
application for a variety of different areas including 
medical decisions (e.g., O’Connor, Pennie, & Dales, 
1996), monetary decisions (e.g., Fagley & Miller, 1997), 
and taxes (e.g., Highhouse & Paese, 1996). 
 
Predictions concerning framing are typically derived 
from prospect theory. According to prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), the decision making process is dichotomous, 
consisting of two phases. The initial phase 
involves editing of the available options. This initial 
phase is characterized by the simplification and reorganization 
of the available options. The options are first 
coded as gains or losses, relative to a neutral reference 
point. They are then broken down into a simpler form 
and given an individuating code to produce streamlined 
versions of the original options. 
 
The subsequent phase involves evaluation of the edited 
options. In this phase, the subjective values and the 
weighted probabilities for each of the options are evaluated 
in light of the prior editing phase. The subjective 
values and probabilities are then integrated into a single 
value and contrasted relative to each other. 
 
Framing effects in the evaluation phase are depicted 
by the S-shaped value function. The shape of this 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses. This 
depicts prospect theory’s prediction of risk-aversion for 
gains and risk-seeking for losses. That is, an individual 
in the concave curve should prefer 100 dollars for certain 
rather than a 50/50 chance to win 200 or win 
nothing. An individual in the convex curve should prefer 
a 50/50 chance to lose 200 dollars rather than losing 100 
dollars for certain. 
 
Although there are several different types of framing 
manipulations (see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998); 
the most widely tested example involves the Asian disease 
problem (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the 
Asian disease problem the same basic message is used in 
both the gain and loss frames. Participants are told that 
the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. They 
are then presented with two options to combat the disease, 
and asked to choose between them. When framed 
in terms of gains, the two options consist of: 200 people 
will be saved for certain (risk-free option) contrasted 
with a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 
chance that no one will be saved (risk-seeking option). 
When framed in terms of losses, the two options consist 
of: 400 people will die for certain (risk-free option) 
contrasted with a 1/3 chance that no one will die and a 2/ 
3 chance that 600 people will die (risk-seeking option). 
As a variety of different studies have shown (see Kuhberger, 
1998 for review), participants tend to choose the 
risk-safe option (200 saved for certain) when the problem 
is framed in terms of gains and the risky option (1/3 
chance that no one will die and a 2/3 chance that 600 will 
die) when the problem is framed in terms of losses. 
 
The propensity for decision-makers to choose risk-averse 
options, when Asian disease type problems are 
framed in terms of gains, and risk-seeking options when 
framed in terms of losses, is inconsistent with the rational 
predictions of expected utility theory (e.g., Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). According to this 
view, the way in which the decision is framed should not 
change the expected utility of either the risk-seeking or 
risk-averse options. If, because of a person’s utility 
function, the risk-averse option is chosen in the gains 
condition, this option should also be chosen in the losses 
condition; conversely, if the risk-seeking option is chosen 
in the gains condition, it should also be chosen in the 
losses condition. 
 
Recent reviews of framing (e.g., Kuhberger, 1998; 
Levin et al., 1998) have concluded that although there is 
a moderately strong framing effect for manipulations 
that follow the Asian disease paradigm, framing effects 
are not always obtained (e.g., Bless, Betsch, & Franzen, 
1998; Highhouse & Paese, 1996; O’Connor et al., 1996). 
Therefore, a key question is under what conditions, and 
for whom are framing effects most likely (Fagley & 
Miller, 1990; Kuhberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). 
 
 
Framing and a dual-route analysis 
 
Recently, Stanovich and West (2000) have used the 
general assumptions of a family of dual-process theories 
of reasoning (e.g., Epstein et al., 1992; Evans & Over, 
1996; Sloman, 1996) to explain why some individuals 
behave in a maximizing/rational way whereas others do 
not. They propose that, although the exact properties of 
these dual-process accounts are not always identical, 
there are several conceptual similarities that constitute a 
common class of assumptions. These views all assume 
that there are two different processing routes and that 
each route leads to different types of construals. One 
route (system 1 in Stanovich and West’s terminology) is 
relatively automatic and holistic and leads to an automatic 
contextualization of problems whereas the other 
route (system 2) involves a more controlled and analytic 
processing style and serves to decontextualize and depersonalize 
problems. Rather than just engaging in a 
discreet analysis of the information, individuals who use 
a holistic processing style rely on contextual cues that 
allow them to rely upon internal representations of the 
problem. This, in turn, allows them to make inferences 
about the issue or task without detailed scrutiny of the 
material. This type of processing should be especially 
sensitive to contextual cues, such as how the problem is 
framed. 
 
Stanovich and West (2000) argue that individuals 
with a high level of analytic intelligence are more likely 
to engage in system 2 processing, and that, at times, 
individuals with especially high levels of cognitive ability 
will have the requisite computational ability to override 
the influences of system 1. These individuals are able to 
abstract difficult problems into canonical representations 
that are devoid of context, thereby freeing them 
from mistakes that result from the erroneous use of nonrelevant 
information, such as the way the problem is 
framed. Individuals engaging a task with this type 
of analysis initially perform a discreet analysis on each of 
the options within the task. Accordingly, the analysis of 
each alternative should then be aggregated and the option 
with the greatest numeric potentiation should be 
systematically chosen. This type of analysis, when applied 
to a decision task containing options of equal 
values, should yield similar results, independent of the 
framing of the task. 
 
Stanovich and West (2000) use their model to explain 
why several authors (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1999; Johnson- 
Laird & Byrne, 1993) propose that the way in which 
perceivers search for a model is not governed by an ordered 
system of principles. Building on their system 1/ 
system 2 distinction, Stanovich and West (2000) conclude 
that some of the variability in perceivers’ search activities 
can be accounted for by considering individual variations 
in cognitive ability and task construals (see also Stanovich 
& West, 1999). They suggest that the search process 
appears to not be determined by an organized system 
because individuals differ, for example, in their propensity 
to use different cognitive processing styles, such as 
system 1 and system 2 styles of thought, as well as in their 
tendencies toward cognitive closure/structure (e.g., 
Kruglanski, 1989; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Therefore, 
each individual’s style of epistemic regulation 
may be relatively consistent, despite the existence of 
inter-individual variability in cognitive styles. 
In their analysis, Stanovich and West (2000) concentrate 
on individual differences in intellectual/cognitive 
abilities and not on how contextual and cognitive 
style differences impact the likelihood and strength of 
framing effects. Their distinction, however, between 
system 1 and 2 processing is consistent with several social 
psychological approaches (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Epstein 
et al., 1992; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) that have been used to examine how 
contextual and cognitive style differences influence an 
individual’s processing style and ultimately social judgment. 
Consequently, these models are especially relevant 
to the question examined in the present paper; namely 
how are framing effects influenced by contextual and 
cognitive style differences. 
 
To answer this question, we use the central assumptions 
of Chaiken’s (1987) systematic/heuristic dual-process 
model as well as previous theorizing that implicates 
cognitive effort in the decision process (e.g., Payne et al., 
1988; Simon, 1956). Because holistic/heuristic processing 
is less effortful than analytic/systematic processing, 
cognitive, and motivational factors influence the use of 
these two processing styles (e.g., Chaiken, 1987). 
Holistic/heuristic processing normally occurs when 
an individual has low levels of motivation or ability 
whereas, because analytic/systematic processing is significantly 
more effortful than holistic/heuristic processing, 
it only occurs when individuals are both willing 
(having sufficient motivation) and able (having sufficient 
capacity and capability) to perform the task at hand. 
Therefore, in situations where cognitive ability is not 
constrained, motivational factors, such as the personal 
relevance of the decision task, emerge as the determining 
cause for effort allocation. Specifically, as the relevance 
of the decision increases, so too does the amount of 
effort that an individual is willing to expend on the decision 
task; and as the amount of task-related effort increases, 
so too does the likelihood of analytic/systematic 
processing. 
Overview of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the self-relevance of 
the decision context to alter individuals’ willingness to 
expend resources (cognitive effort) on the decision task. 
We expected individuals to adopt a predominately analytical 
style of thinking when they worked on a personally 
relevant decision task whereas we expected them 
to adopt a predominantly holistic/heuristic style when 
the decision task was personally irrelevant. Consequently, 
framing effects should be especially weak when 
participants work on a self-relevant task but not when 
they work on a personally irrelevant one. In Experiment 
2, we took advantage of the fact that there are individual 
differences in the use of analytical/systematic versus 
holistic/heuristic processing (e.g., Zenhausern, 1978) by 
comparing the decisions of individuals who were predisposed 
to use either an analytic or holistic style of 
thinking. Converging evidence for a holistic/analytical 
analysis of framing will be obtained, if, across both experiments, 
we observe weaker gain/loss framing effects 
when individuals engaged in an analytic as opposed to a 
holistic style of thinking. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In a classic study testing implications of the heuristicsystematic 
model, Liberman and Chaiken (1996) 
induced perceivers to engage in either a primarily analytical/ 
systematic or a primarily heuristic/holistic processing 
mode by manipulating the relevance of a task 
designed to measure attitudes. Perceivers engaged in 
analytic/systematic processing when the task was self-relevant 
whereas they engaged in heuristic/holistic processing 
when it was not. In much the same way that 
perceivers were induced to engage in an analytic processing 
style when they worked on a highly self-relevant 
task, they should also be induced to engage in an analytic 
analysis of a decision problem when the correctness 
of the problem is highly relevant to the outcomes that 
they may receive. In this situation, perceivers are involved 
because the effectiveness of their decision-making 
ability is tied to important personal outcomes (e.g., 
Johnson & Eagly, 1989). In such contexts, decision-makers 
should undertake a computational analysis of 
the options within the decision problem itself, and their 
decisions should be relatively insensitive to the way in 
which the decision is framed. Therefore, in this situation, 
decision-makers may respond in a way that is 
 
consistent with the predictions of expected utility theory 
and framing effects may not be observed. 
 
In contrast, when the outcome of a decision-task is 
irrelevant to perceivers, they should engage in a primarily 
holistic analysis of the decision problem. Rather 
than predominantly focusing on a detailed analysis of 
the information, perceivers should be heavily influenced 
by contextual cues, such as the way in which the problem 
is framed; as a result, they should respond differently 
to problems framed in terms of gains as opposed to 
those framed in terms of losses. Consequently, in this 
situation, perceivers’ decisions should not conform to 
the predictions of rational/maximizing models, such as 
expected utility theory. Rather, they should conform to 
framing models, such as prospect theory. Experiment 1 
was designed to test these predictions. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
 
One-hundred ninety six female undergraduates from 
the University of North Carolina at Greensboro received 
credit toward a class requirement for their participation 
in this study. Participants were run in groups containing 
an average of approximately seven persons; within each 
session, we randomly assigned each participant to one of 
the four experimental conditions. The experiment consisted 
of a 2 (high or low task relevance) x 2 (framing 
gains/losses) between subjects design. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were initially informed that the purpose 
of this experiment was to obtain their opinion regarding 
a particular situation. They were then told that they 
would be provided with further information on the front 
page of the booklet, that they should take their time in 
carefully reading through all of the materials, and that 
after making their decision, they should turn all of the 
materials face down on the desk in front of them. Each 
participant was then presented with typed stimulus 
materials containing the relevance manipulation followed 
by the Asian disease problem framed as either 
gains or losses.1 
 
 
 
Relevance manipulation 
 
We manipulated the relevance of the Asian disease 
problem in a manner consistent with Liberman and 
Chaiken (1996). Participants read that (low-relevance 
manipulation in brackets) ‘‘The University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro’s committee on academic policy 
is in the process of preparing recommendations concerning 
undergraduate policy changes as part of a program 
of academic reevaluation for the 2002 academic 
term.’’ 
 
Among the changes being recommended for immediate 
[long term] implementation next year [10 years from 
now] is the imposition of a requirement that ‘‘all seniors 
take an additional mandatory class in thinking and decision- 
making.’’ This class would add an additional 3 credit 
hours to each programs required number of hours. 
Participants were also told that ‘‘a passing grade 
would be required if the student was to graduate. If 
approved, the mandatory class would be adopted by the 
university during the Spring 2002 [2012] academic term. 
Thus, all [no] current students at UNCG would be 
personally affected by this policy change.’’ 
 
Participants then read that, ‘‘as part of the committee’s 
research on this potential policy change we would 
like you to evaluate the situation on the following 
page.’’ Participants were then confronted with the traditional 
Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981) framed either as gains or losses and were asked to 
choose between the risk-averse and risk-seeking options. 
 
 
Results and discussion: Experiment 1 
 
We expected the relevance of the task (high or low) to 
interact with the way in which the decision was framed. 
In the high relevance condition, we expected participants 
to use an effortful analytic/systematic processing 
style and be relatively insensitive to framing effects— 
their decision would be largely unaffected by the gain/ 
loss framing manipulation. In the low relevance condition, 
however, participants were expected to engage in a 
relatively automatic, holistic, processing style and be 
especially sensitive to the way in which the decision was 
framed. Therefore, we expected participants to be inclined 
to choose the risk-averse option when the problem 
was framed in terms of gains and the risk-seeking 
option when it was framed in terms of losses. 
To test these predictions, we performed a 2 (high/low 
relevance) x 2 (gain/loss framing) nominal logistic X2 
analysis on participants’ decisions. The results of our 
analysis, as may be seen in Table 1, revealed a main 
effect for framing X2(1, N = 196) = 8.75, p < .01. This 
effect, however, was qualified by the predicted relevance 
x framing interaction, X2(1, N = 196) = 4.18, 
p < .05. This interaction suggests that participants’ responses 
to the gain/loss framing manipulation depended 
upon the relevance of the task. To decompose this interaction, 
we performed a nominal logistic X2 analysis of 
participants’ decisions in each of the two relevance 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to our predictions, participants, in the 
high relevance condition, should engage the information 
with an analytic processing style and, as a result, they 
should be relatively insensitive to the way in which the 
decision was framed. As expected, a nominal logistic 
X2 analysis of participants’ decisions in the high relevance 
condition did not reveal a framing main effect, 
X2(1, N = 97) = 0.44, p > .5. 
 
A framing effect, however, was expected in the low 
relevance condition. Consistent with this expectation, a 
nominal logistic X2 analysis revealed a gain/loss framing 
effect, X2(1, N = 99) = 12, p < .01. Participants, in the 
gains condition, demonstrated a preference for risk 
averse options X2(1, N = 49) = 10.8, p < .01 whereas 
participants, in the losses condition, demonstrated an 
opposite pattern—a preference for the risk-seeking option, 
X2(1, N = 50) = 2.9, p < .09. 
 
 
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 demonstrated a 
Relevance x gain/loss framing interaction. When the task 
was highly relevant, individuals engaged in an effortful, 
analytic, processing style and were relatively insensitive 
to the way in which the decision was framed. When the 
task was not especially relevant, however, individuals 
engaged in a relatively automatic, holistic, processing 
style, and their decisions were sensitive to the way in 
which the decision was framed. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
In Experiment 1, we followed Liberman and Chaiken’s 
lead by manipulating the relevance of the task in 
order to induce participants into using either a predominantly 
analytic/systematic or holistic/heuristic 
processing style. In doing so, we were able to test the 
notion that individuals who use a primarily holistic style 
of thinking are sensitive to the effects of framing whereas 
those who use a predominantly analytic style are not. 
In Experiment 2, we did not manipulate relevance; 
rather, we took advantage of the fact that some individuals 
are predisposed toward an analytic versus holistic 
style of thinking. From the present analysis, it 
follows that the decision patterns of individuals who 
have a tendency to be analytic in thought should be 
conceptually similar to the ones displayed by individuals 
who were induced to adopt an analytic style; it also 
follows from our analysis that the decision patterns of 
individuals who have a tendency to be holistic in 
thought should be conceptually similar to the ones displayed 
by individuals who were induced to adopt a 
primarily holistic processing style. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
 
Three hundred seventy-eight female undergraduate 
students participated in this study as partial fulfillment 
of a course requirement. Participants were run in groups 
containing approximately 10 participants; within each 
group session, we randomly assigned each participant to 
one of two framing (gains/losses) conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Preference test. Participants were first presented with 
the Zenhausern (1978) preference test (PT). The PT is 
an index of cognitive style consisting of 20 items. Ten 
of the items address cognitions that are consistent with 
an analytic style (e.g., are you logical?) whereas the 
remaining 10 items address cognitions that are consistent 
with a holistic/imaginal style of thinking (e.g., do 
you like teaching or explaining by visual presentation?). 
A preference for analytic cognitions indicates a 
reliance on an analytic style of thinking whereas preference 
for holistic cognitions indicates a reliance on a 
holistic style. 
 
Several studies have supported the validity, test–retest 
reliability and internal consistency of the Zenhausern 
(1978) test (e.g., Morton, 2001; Russo et al., 2001; 
Thompson & Mueller, 1984; Zenhausern & Nickel, 
1979). Concerning the validity of the test, Zenhausern 
and Nickel (1979) found that participants who had a PT 
determined holistic style were better at the holistic task 
of maze learning than those with a PT determined 
preference for an analytic style; and Russo et al. found 
that students’ affective states were influenced by the 
match between their PT determined cognitive styles and 
the type of instruction that they received. Students in the 
Russo et al. study who had an analytic style were more 
depressed when they attended a holistic oriented school 
whereas those who had a holistic style were more depressed 
when they attended an analytic oriented school. 
Therefore, this measure has been validated across several 
different contexts. After participants completed the 
Zenhausern preference test, they were presented with the 
classic Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), framed as either gains or losses. 
 
 
Results and discussion: Experiment 2 
 
Scores on the Zenhausern preference task were calculated 
by subtracting the 10 holistic based items from the 10 
analytic based items. Relatively high scores indicate that 
perceivers have a preference for an analytic style of 
thinking whereas relatively low scores indicate a preference 
for a holistic style. To test our prediction that analytic 
thinkers would be relatively insensitive to framing 
effects, we divided participants into analytic (top half of 
sample) or holistic thinkers (bottom half) and performed 
a 2 (top half/bottomhalf) x 2 (gain/loss framing) nominal 
logistic X2 analysis. The results of this analysis revealed a 
main effect for framing, X2(1, N = 378) = 24.8, p < .001. 
This effect, however was qualified by a preferred thinking 
style (top half/bottom half) x gain/loss framing interaction 
X2(1, N = 378) = 4.9, p < .05. As may be seen from 
Table 2, although participants chose the risk-averse option 
in the gains framing condition, X2(1, N = 189) = 
49.8, p < .001 and the risk-seeking option in the loss 
framing condition, X2(1, N = 189) = 36.5, p < .001, the 
preferred thinking style x framing interaction indicated 
that this effect was most pronounced for holistic thinkers. 
Further evidence for our perspective should be found 
if we compare the top 25% and bottom 25% of our 
sample population—the decisions of participants who 
adopt a relative extreme analytic thinking style (top 25% 
of our sample) with those who adopt a relatively extreme 
holistic thinking style (bottom 25% of our sample). 
With this subsample (N = 189), we should again 
obtain a preferred thinking style x gain/loss framing 
interaction. Participants who use a chronically extreme 
analytic style should be less sensitive to framing effects 
than those who use a chronically extreme holistic style. 
 
 
 
 
 
A nominal logistic X2 analysis of the decisions of participants 
in the top and bottom 25% of our sample revealed 
a main effect for framing X2(1, N = 189) = 19.35, 
p < .001. as well as a significant preferred thinking style 
x gain/loss framing interaction, X2(1, N = 189) = 5.13, 
p < .05. This interaction was due to the fact that the gain/ 
loss frame had a significant impact on the decisions of 
participants who used a holistic style (bottom 25%), 
X2(1, N = 94) = 20.4, p < .001, whereas it had only a 
marginal impact on the decisions of those who used an 
analytical thinking style (top 25%), X2(1, N = 95) = 
2.7 p > .09. 
 
The results of this study suggest that individuals’ 
general thinking style plays an important role in their 
decision-making preferences. As predicted, framing effects 
were stronger for holistic than for analytic style 
thinkers. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Under what conditions, why, and for whom are 
framing effects most likely? In this paper, we build on 
the existing literature (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Epstein et al., 
1992; Evans & Over, 1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Payne et al., 1988; Simon, 1956; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich 
& West, 2000) in providing answers to these questions. 
Individuals who used a predominantly holistic 
processing style were especially likely to be influenced by 
the way in which the decision was framed whereas those 
who used a predominantly analytical style were not. In 
Experiment 1, we used self-relevance to induce individuals 
into using a holistic or analytical processing style 
whereas, in Experiment 2, we compared the decisions of 
individuals who were predisposed toward either an analytic 
or holistic processing style. Across both experiments, 
we found that, when individuals used a 
predominantly holistic/heuristic style, they were influenced 
by the way in which the decision was framed, and 
their responses conformed to predictions derived from 
prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
However, when individuals used a predominantly analytic/ 
systematic processing style, they were either insensitive 
(Experiment 1) or relatively insensitive 
(Experiment 2) to the influence of our framing manipulations. 
These data support our idea that the responses 
of analytic style thinkers are more likely to conform to 
predictions derived from expected utility theory (e.g., 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944 ) than those of 
holistic/heuristic style thinkers. 
 
Integrative utility of a holistic/analytic distinction 
There are a number of findings that may be understood 
via a holistic/analytic account. Stanovich and West (2000) 
discussed how the results of some of these studies can be 
understood by considering how individual variations in 
ability can influence the use of holistic and analytic processing. 
We will discuss ways in which other studies can be 
understood by considering how variations in the context 
and a decision-makers_ individualistic cognitive style can 
influence the use of these two different processes, thereby 
influencing the strength and likelihood of framing effects. 
Medical decision-making is an area of research in 
which motivational influences are seen. Some studies in 
this area have shown support for prospect theory (e.g., 
McNeil, Weichselbaum, & Pauker, 1978), others have 
not (e.g., O’Connor, Boyd, Warde, Stolbach, & Till, 
1987; Siminoff & Fetting, 1989), whereas still others 
have reported mixed results (e.g., Christiansen, 1991). 
One common distinction among these studies is whether 
the medical decision problem is a vignette study presented 
as possible options or whether the decision 
problem involves personally relevant, real-life situations, 
that the person is facing. 
 
When the decision is not relevant, research has generally 
provided support for prospect theory and the influence 
of framing. For example, McNeil, Pauker, Sox, 
and Tversky (1982) examined framing effects of a decision 
task involving operable lung cancer. The participants 
(physicians, patients, and graduate students) in 
this study did not have lung cancer, nor were they being 
treated for life threatening medical problems. The re- 
searchers found that the framing of the problem, either 
as survival rates or mortality rates, influenced the type 
of therapy (surgery/risk-seeking or radiation/risk-avoidant) 
that was chosen. Conceptually similar results were 
obtained by Eraker and Sox (1981). In contrast, several 
studies indicate that framing effects are not observed 
when the decision has consequences to the decision-maker. 
For example, an experimental study by O’Connor 
et al. (1996) found that, for patients who were 
actually in the position of receiving a vaccination injection, 
decisions about receiving the vaccine were not 
affected by whether the alternatives were framed with 
potential benefits (percentage who remain free of the flu) 
or potential negative occurrences (percentage who acquire 
the flu). Another study by Siminoff and Fetting 
(1989) examined 100 breast cancer patients and found 
that the physicians’ presentation of the alternatives— 
positively (e.g., survival rates) or negatively (e.g., negative 
outcomes)—had no effect on the patients’ decision 
about high versus low-risk treatment. The importance of 
relevance is also seen in a recent study by Krishnamurthy, 
Carter, and Blair (2001) in which they compared 
the medical decisions of students who had the 
disease in question to those who did not. As would be 
expected from a holistic/analytic perspective, the decisions 
of patients who did not have the disease were affected 
by the researchers’ goal framing manipulation 
whereas those who did have the disease were not. 
 
Further evidence for the influence of processing styles 
on framing effects comes from research by Bless et al. 
(1998). These researchers manipulated the focus of the 
context in which a problem was presented and found 
that participants’ decisions were relatively insensitive to 
framing effects when the problem was presented in a 
statistical context. Because it is reasonable to suspect 
that a statistical context induced perceivers to engage in 
an analytic processing mode, participants_’ 
 was 
framed. In a similar vein, the amount of time that decision- 
makers have to solve a problem should also influence 
their use of processing styles. For example, 
because individuals working under a time constraint are 
less able to carry out the requisite cognitive abilities 
involved in analytic processing, we would expect time 
pressured decision-makers to be especially sensitive to 
the way a problem is framed. Consistent with this reasoning, 
Takemura (1994) found that individuals who 
were forced to take relatively large amounts of time 
thinking about a problem were less sensitive to the way 
in which the problem was framed relative to those who 
worked under time constraint. 
 
 
Summary 
 
We predicted that the way in which a decision is 
framed should have a relatively weak influence on those 
who were either induced (Experiment 1) or predisposed 
(Experiment 2) to adopt a predominantly analytic/systematic 
versus holistic/heuristic processing style. The 
results of both experiments supported these predictions. 
 
 
 
  
NOTES 
 
1. The Asian disease problem used in this study was the same as that 
used by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) for approximately half (102) of 
our participants. African disease was substituted for Asian disease for 
approximately half of our participants (94). We instituted this change 
to test the generality of our findings. Specifically, to observe whether 
geographic origins might influence our results. We entered origin of 
disease (Asian or African) into a Post-hoc analysis and the results 
revealed no difference between the two versions X2(1, N = 196) = 0.02, 
p > .8. Further, only 6 of our participants receiving the African disease 
version were African Americans and all were included within our 
analysis. Therefore we collapsed across this variable. 
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